Abstract. This article analyzes local debates around the enactment of New York's 1973 Rockefeller Drug Laws, which marked a watershed moment in the turn towards punitive drug policy. This history contributes to a growing body of literature that has challenged and complicated the traditional backlash narrative of "law and order." Governor Nelson Rockefeller did not root his campaign for harsh new drug laws in the politics of white racial backlash. Instead, he championed the laws by publicizing their endorsement by several African American community leaders from Harlem. This article argues that historians must take seriously Americans' perceived threats to security and safety in order to better understand the public's embrace of punitive politics in the later twentieth century. More attention to the ways local community leaders debated and promoted crime policy better informs our understanding of the punitive turn and the formation of a bipartisan legislative effort responsible for the War on Drugs.
In late January 1973, a group of black community leaders from Harlem appeared in a televised press conference with New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller to support his call for stricter drug laws. When they stepped to the microphone they described a neighborhood in the midst of a heroin crisis: Reverend Oberia Dempsey of the Park Avenue Baptist Church announced that "In Harlem the non-addict has become a prisoner of the addict, afraid to even walk the streets." No other New Yorkers, Dempsey continued, "have felt the impact of drug addiction and crime more than we have. It's time to start thinking about the people who are victims of these crimes by addicts, time to start protecting ourselves… time to stop listening to bleeding hearts." Reverend Earl B. Moore agreed, telling the audience, "I come from a land that is fast becoming a waste, howling wilderness… where the addicts reign and the nonaddicts have become slaves and can barely exist… We come today believing that our governor bears the mark of a hero." Glester Hinds, head of the People's Civic and Welfare Association in Harlem, went so far as to advocate capital punishment for drug offenses, and demanded that legislators "pass a stern law." He continued, "as a matter of fact, I don't think the governor went far enough." 1 Two weeks earlier, in his annual State of the State speech, Governor Rockefeller had called for "brutal honesty" in dealing with New York's drug problem and had proposed a stunning revision of the state's drug laws. Rockefeller warned the state legislature against "the risk… of the ultimate destruction of our society as a whole" by "an invading army" of addicts and drug dealers, who had already "effectively destroyed" entire neighborhoods. Rockefeller told his audience that virtually every opinion poll showed that the public's number one growing concern was crime and drugs, coupled with an "all pervasive fear" for the safety of their persons and property. "This reign of fear cannot be tolerated," Rockefeller solemnly pronounced. 2 The governor's plan would implement mandatory life sentences for anyone convicted of distributing "hard drugs," with no chance for a reduction of charge, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; life imprisonment for anyone convicted of crimes of violence while under the influence of drugs; and the payment of bounties of $1,000 to people who provided information that led to the conviction of drug dealers."
3 "Society has no alternative," he told the legislature, which had been "stunned to silence." 4 The Rockefeller Drug Laws, as they came to be called, were a significant milestone in the massive increase in American reliance on incarceration over the last quarter of the twentieth century. 5 They were the harshest drug laws in the nation and were among the first of their kind. They marked a crucial step in the development of the modern War on Drugs, popularizing the use of mandatory minimum sentences and redirecting the state's anti-addiction resources from treatment to law enforcement and punishment. 6 The laws became, as epidemiology professor Ernest Drucker put it, "the pump responsible for the state's epidemic of mass incarceration." 7 Although the Rockefeller Drug Laws have been well recognized as a significant influence in the origins of mass incarceration, scholars have spent less time investigating the politics around their enactment. 8 This history suggests a way to rethink the traditional "law and order" narrative. The Rockefeller laws signaled, and helped to facilitate, a major shift in the political landscape around law and order and tougher sentencing laws. More attention to the ways policymakers, the media, and other public voices promoted crime policy better informs our understanding of the punitive turn and the evolution of "law and order" into a bipartisan legislative effort.
Between 1964 and 1972, law and order was largely a partisan political platform with little in the way of concrete legislative consequences outside of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 9 But the enactment of the nation's toughest drug laws by a well-known liberal Republican marked a new era of bipartisan legislation to remake the criminal justice system with increasingly harsh and punitive sanctions. 10 In an era of doubt about the logic and utility of the prison, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle reversed the trend of expanding alternative criminal sanctions and embraced incarceration as the state's primary response to law-breaking, social ills, and the illicit drug market.
11 Seemingly in a bipartisan race to outdo one another and demonstrate "tough on crime" bona fides, state and federal legislators rewrote penal codes, and in the process, began to send more and more people to prison and for longer periods of time. 12 In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the national War on Drugs and the War on Crime grew increasingly punitive, and while these wars became associated with Ronald Reagan and other conservative Republicans, they were clearly a bipartisan endeavor. 13 Many prominent liberals and Democrats including Delaware Senator Joe Biden, New York City Council President Andrew Stein, Liberal Democrat and Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, and United States Congressman Charles Rangel from Harlem joined Nelson Rockefeller as anti-drug and crime crusaders who urged stringent laws and long, mandatory prison sentences to combat what they viewed as a dire situation, and to demonstrate their toughness on crime. By 1992, when Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton left the campaign trail to return to Arkansas (where he was Governor) to oversee the execution of a mentally impaired African American man named Ricky Ray Rector -so that no one could mistake him for being "soft on crime" -law and order had reached what Matthew Lassiter calls "popular consensus." 14 This article builds on recent scholarship that has challenged and complicated the older narrative of white racial backlash as the cause of this turn to "law and order" politics. While not ignoring the importance of race, this new field of scholarship has emphasized the need to historicize crime and the production of the public's understanding of both the problem of crime as well as potential solutions. 15 As Julilly Kohler-Hausmann rightly argues, "the ascendency of 'law and order' politics was neither inevitable nor reflexive." Like Kohler-Hausmann, I position the growth of law and order as both a tool used proactively by politicians to mobilize constituents and "reshape the political terrain," and also as a response to demands from citizens in what Michael Flamm calls a "feedback loop." 16 Kohler-Hausmann argues that white voters' demand for greater punitive crime policy resulted out of a sense of "loss of stature and privileges as economic opportunities narrowed and traditionally marginalized groups gained new rights." 17 I agree that the framing of a zerosum rights contest was important to the construction of law and order politics, but, especially given the participation of African American community leaders in the campaign for stricter laws, historians must also take seriously Americans' perceived threats to security and safety in the public embrace of punitive politics that came after years of seemingly failed treatment-based projects -especially in New York, where heroin addiction was highly concentrated in poor African American and Puerto Rican communities.
It is essential to historicize the production of crime as a social problem in this period, rather than naturalize either the identification of crime as an is-sue, or the growing assumption that the optimal crime-control solution was an abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal and an embrace of punitive legislation. But in historicizing crime, we must not ignore the very real impact of the perception of insecurity on the production of crime policy and politics. New Yorkers' sense of insecurity -specifically as it related to the street crime that many people associated with heroin addiction -had grown to such an extent by 1973 that a significant portion of the population began to embrace tougher crime policy. The embrace of punitive measures spanned racial, class, and party lines, and included many who might have opposed harsher laws in earlier moments. This embrace did not emerge organically out of rising fear of crime, but was the product of a conservative campaign that posited earlier liberal crime-control and anti-addiction efforts as failed projects.
As a corrective to the older backlash narrative, much of the newer scholarship contends that liberals and Democrats were equal partners in embracing and promoting law and order in the 1960s and 1970s and creating the laws that led to mass incarceration. 18 As Heather Ann Thompson writes, "Democratic politicians at the local and national levels focused substantial attention on the issue; they not only took great pains to speak to constituents' fears about safety but they also fueled them." 19 I argue that the 1960s incarnation of the "law and order movement" was a specifically punitive approach to crime control that began largely as a rhetorical platform used by conservatives to critique advances to civil rights and delegitimize liberal crime policy and the welfare state at large. Ironically, however, it evolved into a bipartisan legislative effort as it became clear that multiple constituencies identified crime as a major source of concern, believed the rehabilitative ideal had failed, and demanded more punitive state action. 20 One of the more overlooked concerned constituencies was African Americans, who faced the highest rates of crime victimization and whose neighborhoods were most dramatically affected by heroin addiction. 21 While African American leaders proposed a range of solutions to these problems (as Samuel Roberts notes elsewhere in this issue), the support of some of Harlem's most vocal hardliners in the early 1970s helped legitimize the new law's severity and encouraged their passage.
A wAste, HowlIng wIlderness In a February, 1973 speech at a legislative dinner with the Empire State Chamber of Commerce in Albany, an impassioned Rockefeller shouted into the microphone: "We the citizens are imprisoned by pushers. I want to put the pushers in prison so we can come out." According to the New York Times report, the elite audience applauded politely, but did not share Rockefeller's passion. 22 Numerous upstate district attorneys agreed with the governor that aspects of the penal codes needed to be "tightened up," but privately indicated to state representatives that they believed it would be "nearly impossible" to get "upstate" juries to convict if the conviction mandated a sentence of life in prison. 23 Internal memos made it clear that the Rockefeller staff also had doubts about the willingness of white, "upstate" communities to accept such harsh laws.
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To ease the hypothesized concerns of upstate residents -who may have been more distressed over growing adolescent reefer consumption than heroin epidemics -staff members suggested that Rockefeller publicize the support of several prominent African American community leaders from Harlem, and he soon staged a press conference with Reverend Dempsey, Reverend Moore, Glester Hinds, and several other black supporters of hard-line crime policy. 25 As residents of the neighborhoods most affected by heroin addiction, Harlemites' support for the laws would legitimize the laws' severity to ambivalent upstate New Yorkers. If Harlem residents supported the laws, Rockefeller hoped the thinking would go, how could anyone else argue?
Rockefeller's strategy advanced a new law-and-order paradigm that challenged its associations with white racial backlash. At least some black activists had been advocating this revisionist notion of law and order for several years. In late 1970, Civil Rights leader Bayard Rustin also called for a redefinition of law and order. Rustin claimed that "law-and-order" was too often a "euphemism for anti-black attitudes," but insisted that law and order need not be a conservative and racist proposal. "Certainly conservatives and racists have made use of this slogan to further their own deplorable ends, but it should not follow, therefore, that liberals and blacks should be against the content of the slogan," Rustin contended. Urging progressives not to allow conservatives to define the issue, Rustin asserted that the difference between liberals and conservatives should be on the substance of how to best fight crime. 26 "The fact that George Wallace said it, doesn't mean it isn't true," claimed Vincent Baker of the NAACP in 1968. "Even a stopped clock is right twice a day." 27 The position of Harlemites on the topic of drug addiction and penal policy was far from monolithic. Even among those leaders calling for increased police patrols in black neighborhoods, there was a diversity of opinions and politics. In recent years, many African American merchants and community leaders had agitated for an end to police neglect and complicity in drug trafficking in their communities. 28 Since the Knapp Commission's investigation into allegations of police bribery and participation in the illegal drug market had confirmed widespread corruption within the NYPD three years earlier, several black community leaders and politicians had begun to frame the push for increased policing as a way to end discriminatory law enforcement practices. According to these leaders, the city had failed to ensure the safety and security of all its citizens equally, and they demanded more and better policing in black neighborhoods as the fulfillment of civic entitlements.
29 These demands opened a political space for Rockefeller to frame harsh drug laws that would target low-level offenders, most of whom would be people of color, as a measure designed to protect black New Yorkers. 30 Rockefeller chose some of the strongest advocates of stringent law enforcement to appear at his press conference and champion his laws. Reverend Dempsey, for example, was a longtime foe of the narcotics treatment model, which had put him in a minority opinion in 1960s New York City. 31 In recent years, Dempsey had been joined by Vincent Baker and Glester Hinds as outspoken advocates of tough crime measures and increased law enforcement in Harlem.
32 By 1973, the frustration expressed by Dempsey and his colleagues over heroin addiction and street crime had become increasingly more common among black New Yorkers across class lines, although there was far less consensus on how to fix the problem. 33 In New York City, seventy percent of the victims of homicides, muggings, and narcotics pushers were African Americans and Puerto Ricans. 34 A 1974 survey of Harlem found that "of the twenty-eight problems afflicting the community, most people interviewed felt that crime in the streets, drug addiction, burglarizing of apartments, youth unemployment, dirty streets, and poor housing conditions were, in that order, the 'very serious' ones." 35 Again, there remained a large range of opinions on how best to address the issue, but the importance of crime, and the fear of crime, among Harlem residents was no politician's invention.
By tapping into these fears, and invoking the most famous African American neighborhood in the United States, the Rockefeller administration could discuss "Harlem leaders" without explicitly bringing race into the debate over the laws. "Harlem" was used as a proxy for poor black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods throughout New York City. Importantly, such language signaled to white upstate voters that the new laws were not aimed at them -that it would not be their children or loved ones who would be facing life sentences.
36 Yet Rockefeller's strategy was not exactly that of the race-baiter common in the traditional law and order narrative. Instead, Rockefeller presented his laws as a necessary protection for black working and middle-class New Yorkers who had suffered from the neglect and indifference of law enforcement for too long.
Rockefeller's decision to organize a publicity campaign around the testimony of several Harlem leaders established a legitimizing authority onto black hardliner voices. In this way, those who opposed the laws could be portrayed as being insensitive or out of touch with the needs of African Americans. The oft-repeated slogan was that "bleeding hearts" had their priorities confused. Rockefeller at once engaged in dramatic drug demagoguery and at the same time wielded black support for his policies to neutralize critics and insulate himself from charges of pandering to a right-wing law and order movement that had become highly visible since the 1968 presidential elections, and that was closely associated with white racial backlash.
That Rockefeller would use the support of a few hardliner religious leaders from Harlem to further his cause was not surprising or unprecedented for the governor. 37 Nor was it uncommon at the time for prominent African Americans to advocate tough-on-crime politics. A few months earlier, in Atlanta, two African American mayoral candidates had both actively campaigned on promises to "crack-down on street crime and bust the pusher," warning that if nothing was done, Atlanta would become "a southern version of New York." The Washington Post reported: "several years ago many blacks -and whiteswould have taken such rhetoric as shorthand for racism: this year they cheered the tough-on-crime talk." 38 The Rockefeller laws might well have been passed without the vocalized support of community leaders from Harlem, and "upstate New York" was likely less reticent to pass tough sentencing laws than Rockefeller's staff feared. A Gallup Poll, released one month after Rockefeller's announcement, revealed widespread national approval of the law, suggesting that the campaign might not have been necessary. 39 However, it is revealing that the Rockefeller administration felt compelled to repeatedly demonstrate African American support for the proposed laws. The tactics for getting the laws passed in the state legislature were not simply to draw upon racialized, reactionary fault lines of "law and order" in the tradition of Barry Goldwater or George Wallace. Instead, Rockefeller's tactics reveal a much more complicated political and social moment in the urban north, in which predominately African American and Puerto Rican inner city areas could at once be viewed as locations of fear and disorder and at the same time be presented as the source of political authority, urgency and legitimacy in regards to policy making.
Rockefeller's promotion of African American support for punitive drug laws and increased law enforcement helped open up space for a liberal embrace of law and order. Rockefeller provided a model that demonstrated the political benefits Democrats could enjoy by following the lead of the liberal Republican governor and adopting a "tough on crime" position. His framing of the drug laws helped to transform punitive law and order from a largely rhetorical conservative backlash into a bipartisan legislative effort. The Rockefeller laws were a watershed moment, announcing a coming legislative tsunami as politicians on both sides of the aisle rewrote state and federal penal codes and created new laws, new felonies, and new sentencing schemes. 40 Although the law and order movem ent at large, which was so crucial for creating and defining the War on Drugs, was built at least in part on racist resentments, in its watershed policy moment, Rockefeller articulated its goals in a distinctly different paradigm. Perhaps it was the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement itself that compelled Rockefeller to frame the severe drug laws as a means to save the ghetto, rather than framing it as a necessary tool to save the white New Yorkers from the ghetto. Whereas in 1964 Goldwater had invoked "crime in the streets" as a thinly veiled reference to civil rights disobedience, Rockefeller promoted life sentences as a necessary state response to African American security needs.
Nearly three years after the Knapp Commission had detailed pervasive police complicity in the drug trade in Harlem, Rockefeller promoted radically stringent drug laws as a corrective measure to years of racist police neglect and abuse of black neighborhoods. Framing the issue as one of protection, Rockefeller urged liberal white and black New Yorkers to support his laws.
Surely "protection" was a cause they, too, could rally behind. In the months of campaigning for his proposed drug laws, Rockefeller attempted to demonstrate to conservatives that he was not a "bleeding heart," while also attempting to win over black and white liberal support for the laws under the guise of security and protection. By framing drug use and abuse as primarily an urban problem concentrated in black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods, Rockefeller played to white liberal sympathies and conservative fears simultaneously, while also attempting to appeal to working and middle-class African Americans who felt besieged by the addiction and decay visible on the streets of their neighborhoods.
sometHIng drAstIc must be done With a long history of simultaneous abuse and neglect from law enforcement, Harlem was mostly unfamiliar with state-provided security. 41 Even after the Knapp Commission's revelations of police corruption in 1972, Harlem was still plagued with police indifference, complicity, and violence. 42 In the wake of the proposed laws, neighborhood residents debated the tradeoff of civil liberties for the promise of security.
The responses to Rockefeller's proposed drug laws were as varied in Harlem as they were anywhere else in the city, but according to the New York Times, at community meetings a majority of residents voiced skepticism of the governor's proposal of mandatory life sentences. 43 State Senator Sidney A. Von Luther, a Harlem Democrat, said of the governor's supporters, "they were just the palace pets, the ones who usually endorse [Rockefeller] . The [African American] community can't be fooled by that." 44 Rockefeller's reframing of law and order as race-neutral or even pro-black thus did not go unchallenged. Both Von Luther and Harlem's State Assemblyman George Miller expressed bafflement to the New York Times at the governor's assertion that he had consulted and won the support of Harlem's community leaders. "He did not confer with me," Miller stated. 45 Some Harlemites similarly told the Times that they feared the laws would provide a new excuse for what one resident called "snatching brothers off the street." 46 Crime victimization did not necessarily shape one's political views in Harlem. Several recent mugging victims interviewed by the Times remained concerned about the civil liberties of the addicts and pushers. At least one mugging victim felt that the proposed new laws, which at that point still included life sentences, were a racial conspiracy: "I don't want to violate the civil liberties of these people," stated high school principal Delores Hercules, who went on to describe the Governor's plans as "a destruction of black and Puerto Rican people; I really feel it is a conspiracy, a way of destroying us." 47 Another Harlemite exclaimed, "The Governor is out of his mind, we see him for what he is… When he starts talking about narcotics he's talking about the minority population. He's not dealing with the social pathology. I was stunned." 48 Writer Henry Hall summed up a common concern among black New Yorkers, predicting that the bill would incarcerate "a lot of little black pushers" rather than "the big merchant pusher, who's rich, elusive, and able to avoid the dragnet."
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There were, however, other community members frustrated with the deterioration of their neighborhood and ready to compromise their politics in exchange for major change. Jocelyn Cooper, a self-described civil servant and recent grandmother, supported Rockefeller, telling the Times that she was "very much a liberal and a militant most of the time, but in terms of what he's advocating, I'd like to see it happen." 50 Many other interviewees agreed with Cooper that harsh punishments for pushers were justified, as the dealer "really is a murderer." Writer Les Mathews said of drug pushers, "I'm in favor of burning them alive."
51 If the Times reporting was to believed, sentiment had sharply turned against both the addict and the dealer, even amongst those who opposed a punitive law enforcement approach. 52 And there was evidence to suggest this was the case: neighborhood vigilante groups, as well as the Black Liberation Army, and local street gangs, had recently taken to violently confronting drug pushers in the community. 53 Faced with this diversity of opinions, black and Puerto Rican representatives struggled to determine an appropriate and responsible stance on the legislation. Of the eighteen members of the state legislature's Black and Puerto Rican Caucus, positions ranged from "endorsement by two by legislators, at least partial acceptance by many, guarded neutrality by a few and flat denunciation by six members." 54 Many members of the caucus reported having to exert "considerable community relations efforts" after constituents balked at their criticism of the bill as too harsh and sweeping.
55 " [Rockefeller] has gauged the sentiment in my area very well," reported Senator Vander L. Beatty, who represented the Bedford Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn. Senate Minority Leader Joseph Zaretzki of Washington Heights claimed that Rockefeller's call for severe sentencing was "exactly the same" position of his constituents, who he said were "mortally afraid" and who blamed narcotics for the deteriorating situation in their neighborhood. 56 Even if support for Rockefeller's drug laws remained a minority opinion, his campaign was successful enough that legislators in the Caucus were forced to seriously consider voting for the bill. Several members of the Caucus viewed the laws as an attempt to shift public focus away from the failures of the Governor's earlier drug rehabilitation programs, and his lack of success in addressing education, employment and housing needs in impoverished areas. Noting the possibility of a reelection bid in the coming year, Brooklyn Senator Calvin Williams asked, "Where's [Rockefeller] been? This is his fourth term and he knows he's messed up with Attica and all the rest." 57 A New York Amsterdam News editorial on the drug laws summed up the opinion of many African Americans who were frustrated with the deteriorating situation, but still believed in the promise of rehabilitation. "It's clear that something drastic must be done to stop growing narcotics addiction," the editorial claimed, yet "wherever possible the emphasis should be on treatment as opposed to more imprisonment; even if such treatment must be done under quarantine from the community." 58 New York University Law School professor and former staff attorney for the NAACP Leroy D. Clark came out forcefully against the laws, while also acknowledging Harlem's growing frustration with both addiction and addicts. "I'd like to give some warnings," Clark wrote in the Amsterdam News, "warnings which shouldn't even be necessary, against us -you and I -making the addict and even the addict pusher the 'new nigger,' 'the new spick,' for it can't be done without our help." Clark argued that the target of the new laws would be people of color who would be exploited for political gains, and he challenged the true motives of the law and questioned Rockefeller's promise of protection under the new hardline regime. 59 Yet even the skeptical Clark did not oppose all law enforcement measures. More strikingly, Clark acknowledged a shift in public sentiment that many observers commented on at the time:
None of this means that we can't ask for reasonable law enforcement -especially to deal with the higher-ups who are the real perpetrators of the drug scene… But I say simply you and I must be vigilant and keep our eye on what may be someone's hidden agenda. I know that I ask for a restraint, which our communities now do not feel -because they feel the community is being immobilized by the addict. I only hope that we don't get invited to a hall for the lynching of the addict -and look up to find the doors locked when the ceremony is over.
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While draconian drug laws would likely have been rejected outright as racist and wrong-headed by many white liberals and African Americans (and perhaps even by Rockefeller himself) a few years earlier, by 1973 widespread frustration allowed Rockefeller to reshape the politics of criminal justice policy. The cauldron of crime rates, drug scares, police corruption scandals, and urban decay, along with disillusionment with the criminal justice system, had boiled to the point that many New Yorkers were willing to accept measures they may not have found palatable in earlier moments. Although Clark was an adamant critic of the laws, even he conceded that black community sentiment had turned sharply against the addict at this time.
A complete About-fAce In many ways, Nelson Rockefeller embodied, as much as he produced, the shift away from treatment-based regimes towards punitive crime and drug policies. His personal transformation, as a liberal advocate for addiction treatment and criminal justice reform outside of the penitentiary, mirrored many of his constituents, whose ideas about crime control, order, law enforcement and punishment also became more punitive over the course of his governorship. Rather than being simply the product of political pandering, what twenty-first century voters would come to call "flip-flopping," Rockefeller's ideological shift reflected larger currents that were transforming crime control around the nation. But the governor was far from a passive bystander experiencing the changing currents; his laws were instrumental in catalyzing the punitive turn and the bipartisan embrace of tough-on-crime legislation.
Rockefeller's new drug laws represented what his aides called "a complete about-face" for the governor on the problem of heroin addiction. 61 As governor to the home of more than half the nation's heroin addicts, drug addiction had long been a major concern for Rockefeller. 62 He had discussed narcotics use in thirteen of his past fifteen State of the State speeches, periodically announcing new state programs designed to ameliorate the problem. 63 The majority of Rockefeller's earlier anti-addiction initiatives had focused on treatment and rehabilitation as opposed to law enforcement. In 1962 Rockefeller signed the Metcalf-Volker Act, which defined drug addiction as an illness rather than a crime and which allowed arrested addicts the option of going into treatment rather than facing prosecution. In 1966, Rockefeller declared an "all-out war on narcotics addiction" and developed a controversial compulsory confinement program, under which the state enforced mandatory treatment for certified addicts who had been arrested for a crime, and allowed for magistrates to compel treatment of addicts even if they had not been accused of a crime.
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Howard Shapiro, who served as counsel for the governor, later observed that "no one alive today knows for sure why Rockefeller adamantly pushed for his draconian drug laws." 65 Although the Governor's concern and frustration over New York's drug crisis was genuine, it is likely that his indignation was combined with political ambition. The Washington Post suggested that "he acted from a combination of personal outrage that the state had failed to end its drug crisis and the intuition that tough measures would be politically popular as he prepared for a re-election campaign in 1974." 66 Many political observers at the time read the liberal Republican's hardline proposals as the opening salvo in a 1976 presidential bid. 67 Between the turbulent years of 1958-68, Rockefeller actively pursued the presidency three times. Yet after 1964 his party was moving rapidly to his right, and Rockefeller became a symbol of the older, East Coast liberal elite within the Republican Party. Rockefeller first responded to the new ideological landscape with conviction, calling out the extremists in his own party in a speech at the 1964 Republican convention. 68 But by 1973, Rockefeller was backpedaling, pandering, and apologizing -trying to appease Nixon and adopting the rhetoric of the very people who had mocked him at the 1964 convention. 69 Rockefeller pushed hard to be accepted by the conservative branch of his party, using demagoguery of crime and drugs as the main olive branch. Rockefeller's violent crushing of the Attica prison rebellion in 1971 was a tragic example of this strategy. 70 The drug laws, too, were no small part of those calculations. In his memoir, Rockefeller's speechwriter Joe Presico pointed out the irony: "Nelson, who paid so dearly within his party for a liberal reputation, was the author of possibly the toughest criminal legislation ever enacted in this country outside of capital punishment." 71 By 1973, the Washington Post described most Republicans' view of the New York governor as "indifferent or worse." 72 However, Rockefeller's aides admitted he was trying to "address himself to the problem" by adopting more conservative positions in New York, "recently seeking enactment of the toughest anti-drug laws of any state." Additionally, Rockefeller had been making little-publicized trips to the south, perhaps in an attempt to align himself with southern conservatives. 73 As his proposed drug laws garnered national attention, Rockefeller milked the limelight and positioned himself as the true leader of law and order within the Republican Party. "Taking his act on the road," Rockefeller promoted his anti-drug crusade to mostly Republican crowds, and received "waves of applause." 74 At an annual Lincoln Fund benefit in Chicago, he urged other Republicans to "have the courage of Abraham Lincoln" in carrying out what he called "the war on the home front." 75 The timing of Rockefeller's "about-face" from treatment-based drug programs to a punitive approach was another indication to some observers that Rockefeller's bill was politically motivated. The heroin epidemic had reached its apex around 1970; by 1973, drug use had been on the decline for two years.
76 Officials were aware of the drop in addiction levels at the time Rockefeller proposed his laws, and they had been discussing the decline for months before the State of the State speech. Health Services Administrator, Gordon Chase, reported a sharp fall in the arrest of addicts, less demand for drug treatment facilities, and fewer deaths attributed to heroin overdoses. "We're starting to overtake the problem," Chase told the Post. "[Rockefeller is] throwing in the towel in a hysterical way just at the time when we're starting to make progress." 77 However, Rockefeller's political motives did not negate his genuine interest in reducing addiction in New York. As one biographer said of Rockefeller, "as governor he had a kind of nineteenth-century optimism, a conviction that any problem must, somewhere, have a solution and a means of solving it, given the proper infusion of money and effort." 78 Howard Shapiro recalled:
I think that [Rockefeller] may have developed a deep personal frustration. Here was a problem that he felt very strongly about, to which he had devoted a great deal of his own time and attention and a lot of the State's money. Yet the efforts had been unsuccessful. It had been very frustrating. The most sophisticated thinking had gone into the Narcotic Addiction Control Commission… to deal with this problem and we were losing the war against drugs.
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Rockefeller was well aware of the political advantages of demagoguery and milked the hardline image his drug laws created, but the idea behind the laws was born out of a genuine, though perhaps desperate, desire for results. In fact, although many observers believed that the law came only from Rockefeller's imagination and ambition, in truth, the idea came from a privately funded fact-finding mission to Japan. Modeled on a Japanese life-sentence statute for drug pushers, Rockefeller's laws represented a hope that the threat of long, mandated, prison sentences would effectively deter illicit drug sales and consumption. 80 trIckle-up deterrence Rockefeller's laws were clearly aimed at the lowest-level participants in the illicit drug market, in the hopes that long prison sentences, directed at lowlevel dealers, could finally end addiction. Blaming plea-bargaining for a low drug-conviction rate, Rockefeller matter-of-factly stated, "I wanted to see that anybody who is pushing, top to bottom, is going to go away for life." Rockefeller's theory was that the new laws would make drug dealing "totally unattractive" from the highest to the lowest levels. The "big boys," who were in the top ranks of international drug trafficking and wholesaling, would not be able to hire street-level pushers because no one would be willing to risk life imprisonment. 81 It was a remarkable trickle-up theory that punished the weakest and least influential pawns of the drug trade in hopes that it would put the rich and powerful kingpins out of business -although presumably not behind bars.
Left out of the logic of deterrence, however, was the addiction-induced desperation that compelled some street-level pushers into narcotics retailing and the lure of profit that attracted others to the trade, despite its numerous dangers. As many critics pointed out, as long as there was money to be made selling drugs, there would always be someone willing to run the risks. 82 Brooklyn Assemblyman Stanley Fink declared, "the program does not in any way deal with the large scale drug seller… we won't have any more ammunition to go after these people."
83 As Fink pointed out, the NYPD's efforts against lowlevel offenders had already been determined a "failure" in a report issued by the Department of Investigation of Narcotics Law Enforcement. 84 African American Assemblyman Arthur O. Eve, from Buffalo, also challenged the deterrence theory and pointed out that African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and poor whites were far more likely to end up in jail than were more privileged groups. Eve stated, "prisons today are a great contributor to crime and not really a deterrent… We have documented that our criminal justice system has failed." 85 Calling the laws "the ghetto genocide bill," Eve predicted that the statutes would create chaos and destruction in the neighborhoods that were already suffering the most. "This is possibly the most serious piece of dehumanization legislation that I have seen in my seven years here, because we're not hitting at the problem," Eve proclaimed. Rockefeller dismissed Eve's point of view on the matter. "The ghettos are already in chaos," Rockefeller shot back in what would become his common counterargument. "It is time to protect the innocent."
86 Rockefeller used the support of African American hardliners to claim that he represented the interests of New York's inner cities, and in the process helped to marginalize important voices of dissent. 87 Rockefeller's proposal inspired a great deal of debate about the deterring power of long prison sentences. The very purpose and utility of the prison came under dispute as New Yorkers considered the value of severe and pu-nitive sentencing. New York Post editorial writer Pete Hamill wrote that "If Rockefeller and the Legislature just pass the present boldly punitive laws there won't be jails large enough to hold everybody. The cops, the jails, and the courts cannot handle the cases they now have and to suggest that more of the same will solve the problem is to raise people to an emotional pitch without ever being able to put your solutions into effect." 88 Supporters, on the other hand, often expressed faith that the punitive laws would discourage drug sales. The morning after Rockefeller proposed his drug laws, the New York Daily News editorial wrote approvingly that "A onestrike-and you're-out law, we think, would cause hordes of drug pushers to go out of business rather than chance a lifetime in the clink. It's certainly worth a try."
89 For many New Yorkers, the constant report of growing crime rates, and the sense that liberal crime-control initiatives had failed, compelled harsher sentencing. As New Yorkers increasingly lost sympathy for addicts, and became frustrated with the deterioration of the city, prison's capacity to deter and punish grew in popular discourse, while rehabilitation fell out of favor. Reporter Phil Tracy commented:
It didn't take a hell of a lot of insight to realize that folks have had it with the "drug addiction is a disease" and "prison is supposed to rehabilitate people" approach to junkies. The days of enlightened liberalism are over. Too many innocent people killed or maimed for life, too much heartbreak over finding one's home repeatedly burglarized and vandalized, too much demeaning oppressive fear for anyone to lose sleep over the plight of the poor under-privileged junkie. To the minds of most people in New York it is no longer a question of how we shall solve the problem of drug addiction, but how am I going to survive… Just get rid of them before they kill us all. An ugly temper, for certain, but it is one that is certainly understandable and growing daily among people who 10 years ago supported Martin Luther King. 90 For these supporters, the severity of the laws was justified by the sense of insecurity that came from the common association of crime with addiction. Tracey, like many other commentators, noted a shift in opinion among frustrated New Yorkers who had been supportive of rehabilitative efforts in earlier years. Many denizens, who likely would have opposed punitive law and order policies in the past, had become extremely disillusioned with the criminal justice system and with liberal crime programs. For these New Yorkers, the theory of deterrence held an appealing, gut-level logic, while the prison cell promised the immediate result of incapacitation when deterrence failed. The Rockefeller laws demonstrated to lawmakers a broad-based appeal of punitive policy across race, class, and party lines, and suggested the trend toward a bipartisan embrace of tough-on-crime legislation.
While many critics worried that the courts and prisons would be stretched beyond capacity, Rockefeller did not foresee, or chose to ignore, the extraordinary extent to which the laws would increase the prison population in New York. He responded to critiques that the laws would necessitate a massive state prison build-up, stating "we have 6,300 vacant spaces in state correc-tional facilities right now," not acknowledging or anticipating that the state's prison population would double over the next ten years. 91 Rockefeller and his supporters believed that the laws were so harsh that pushers would go out of business or leave town. They erroneously assumed that the threat of life in prison would effectively deter the sale of drugs and that few people would actually end up serving life sentences.
92 "Tougher penalties deter criminal acts," declared the Deputy Majority Leader William Conklin. "The nitpickers and the pseudo civil libertarians have not shown another way… In accomplishing these changes for a more compassionate judicial system, we may have strayed from the path that history has taught us is the greatest deterrent to crime and anti-social behavior -the threat of punishment." 93 Yet it was not faith in the courts or the criminal justice system that drove many of the law's advocates to support tough, long, mandatory minimums; in fact quite the opposite. By creating mandatory sentences, Rockefeller took discretion away from judges and enforced uniformity in penal sanctions. For many proponents, the appeal of mandatory minimum sentences came out of a strong disenchantment with the courts and the justice system. Overly lenient judges, backlogged courts, inefficient and corrupt policing, and over-used plea-bargaining shared the blame. 94 Of 94,000 felony arrests in New York City in 1971, only 550 resulted in trials. 95 Although just a fraction of the total, those 550 cases still overloaded the court's dockets.
Both opponents and supporters of the Rockefeller laws were critical of the courts, and the overwhelming brunt of displeasure fell on judges. 96 Proponents of the new laws assumed that mandatory sentencing would effectively deter most would-be criminals and would streamline the judicial process for those left undeterred. A study released by U.S. District Attorney, Whitney North Seymour Jr. exposed disparities in judicial sentencing, inspiring some liberal reformers to also support mandatory sentencing as a means of reducing racial discrepancy, bias, and the opportunity for judicial discrimination. 97 Before the 1973 proposal, Class A-1 felonies already allowed for life sentences or a minimum of fifteen years. 98 Yet of the nearly 27,000 people arrested for felony narcotics violations in New York City in 1970, judges sentenced just one percent to prison. And out of almost 22,000 arrests in 1971, only two percent received sentences of one year or more. 99 To many state representatives such statistics indicated that harsh sentences were not successful and that judges had clearly not found them useful. But to Rockefeller's supporters, these statistics revealed a broken system wherein judges were irresponsibly lenient and criminals could evade punishment. With a prison population that had been on the decline over the past decade, even as crime rates rose, conservatives claimed that lenient, liberal, penal practices were ineffective and blamed them for encouraging and creating more crime even though incarceration rates were falling across the country. tHe nAtIon's HArsHest drug lAws In the end, Rockefeller's strategies worked to get the laws passed. A modified version of the governor's bill was passed along with the Second Offender Felony Act in April of 1973, by a margin of forty-one to fourteen in the Senate and eighty to sixty-five in the State Assembly. 101 The laws went into effect in September. The final bill was not as draconian as the governor's original proposal, but it was still the harshest in the nation. The legislation, officially known as Chapter 276 but popularly called the Rockefeller Drug Laws, required mandatory prison sentences for the sale, or even possession, of controlled substances, keyed to the weight of the drug involved. The highest offence, A-1 felonies, carried a minimum of fifteen to twenty-five years. 102 All Class A felonies mandated lifetime parole supervision. 103 Marijuana was also included in the law, making it the most severe marijuana law to date. 104 The end of indeterminate sentencing and its replacement with fixed (determined) sentencing and mandatory minimum sentences rapidly spread across all fifty states and the District of Columbia between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. 105 With these laws, rehabilitative penology had been struck a fatal blow. From 1973 forward, the War on Drugs was dominated by increased law enforcement, focused almost exclusively on poor communities of color, aggressive prosecution, and long, stringent, often mandatory prison sentences. This focus was intensified with renewed political panic and even harsher laws in response to crack cocaine in the 1980s. 106 A 1977 study of the effect of the Rockefeller Drug Laws concluded that they had had little effect on heroin use or heroin-related crimes, and described the laws as a dismal failure. 107 According to the report, heroin use was as widespread in 1976 as it had been when the laws took effect in 1973, and New York City had also experienced a sharp increase in the types of property crimes associated with drug use.
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The law did "work" in one regard: in the next decade, the New York State prison population more than doubled from approximately 12,500 people in 1973 to about 25,500 by 1983. By 1992, the prison population had soared to 62,000.
109 Between 1985 and 1990, prisoners incarcerated under the Rockefeller laws represented a full third of the entire New York State prison population. 110 The state prison population peaked in 2002 with 70,700 prisoners, marking a 500% increase since 1974. 111 As was foreshadowed in Rockefeller's promotion of the laws, the legislation had a profoundly disproportionate effect on black and Latino offenders and on their communities in urban New York. Police enforcement of the drug laws was concentrated largely in black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods in New York City. Roughly fifty percent of the people incarcerated under the drug laws came from just fourteen neighborhoods in the Bronx, Manhattan, and Brooklyn. 112 Police and prosecutorial enforcement of the laws dramatically affected the urban make-up of mass incarceration. 113 For most of the previous century, New Yorkers from the city were incarcerated at roughly the same rate per capita as New Yorkers from the rest of the state. In the years after the Rockefeller laws, New York City's incarceration rate grew to triple that of the rest of the state. 114 By the end of the twentieth century, the rate of black male drug offenders in prison under the Rockefeller laws was forty times higher than the rate for white males of the same age group. 115 The Rockefeller laws also had a particularly dramatic effect on women of color. In 1973, there were only 400 women in prison in New York. By 1999 there were more than 3,500 women incarcerated in the state. Sixty percent of women prisoners were sentenced under the Rockefeller laws, and ninety-one percent of those women were black or Latina.
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The Rockefeller Drug Laws represented the abandonment of New York State's extensive treatment programs and the turn towards an almost purely punitive approach to heroin addiction and the street crime associated with it. Long, mandated prison sentences were not new, but federal postwar experiments with punitive mandatory minimum sentences had been short-lived and had quickly given way to a new consensus favoring treatment. 117 With the Rockefeller laws, punitive policy and the theory of deterrence were revived at the state level, where they were much more potent, and this time with the support of an assortment of unusual political bedfellows.
The Rockefeller Drug Laws were an important watershed moment in the turn towards mandatory minimum sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing, the declining use of parole, and the emergence of strict policies such as the "three-strikes" laws. 118 These changes in penal policy were the products of bipartisan legislation as Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, embraced the hardline position in a race to outdo one another. This "popular consensus" on crime policy would have been unlikely if law and order had remained associated with the race-baiting white backlash politics of George Wallace, as it had commonly been understood to be in the late 1960s. But the history of the enactment of the Rockefeller laws demonstrates a far more complicated political landscape of drug and crime control in the early 1970s, wherein punitive politics resonated with a larger portion of the public, and law and order was recast as a race-neutral and necessary corrective to the abandoned treatment model. The support for harsh drug policies by a group of vocal African American hardliners, who helped legitimize punitive politics and marginalize opposition on the left, is crucial to understanding how the war on drugs became a bipartisan project fueling mass incarceration in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
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